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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
-vs -

Case No. 950277-CA
:

BRET RAY ARBON and
KIMBERLY SUE MILLIGAN,

Priority No 10

Defendants and Appellants.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of Defendants' motions to
dismiss prosecutions against them for driving under the influence in violation of Section 416-44, Utah Code Ann. (1953), in the Second Judicial Circuit Court for Davis County, the
Honorable K. Roger Bean, presiding. This Court has jursidiction to hear this appeal by virtue
of Sections 77-18a-l(l)(c) and 78-2a-3(2)(d)and(e), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
WHETHER A SUBSEQUENT DUI PROSECUTION IS
BARRED ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS BY A
PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE DRIVER'S LICENSE
SUSPENSION HEARING.
The issue presented is a question of law, and the decision of the Circuit Court
is reviewed by this Court for correctness. Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468 (Utah App. 1993).
The issue was raised and preserved in the trial court by the Defendants' motions to dismiss

on double jeopardy grounds, which motions were denied by the trial court's orders included
in the Addendum herein.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
" . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." U.S. Const. Amend. V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case, Course and Disposition Below
Each of the Defendants was charged criminally with driving under the
influence. Prior to trial, both filed motions to dismiss on the ground that the prosecution
constituted double jeopardy because it followed an administrative driver's license suspension
hearing. The trial court denied the motions, and Defendants immediately petitioned this
Court for permission to appeal.
Statement of Facts
In each of the two cases consolidated in this appeal, the Defendant was arrested
for driving under the influence. Pursuant to §53-3-223 Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1994), an
administrative hearing was held to determine whether the driver's license of each Defendant
should be suspended based upon the arrest. Criminal charges were also brought against each
of the defendants for driving under the influence; these charges arose from the same
incidents for which the administrative suspension hearings had been held.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I
A civil sanction that has any retributive or deterrent effect is punishment for
purposes of double jeopardy analysis, and a criminal prosecution subsequent to the attempted
imposition of such a sanction is barred by the Fifth Amendment. Whether the sanction in
question has or is intended to have some remedial aspect does not remove it from the
characterization as punishment if it also has some deterrent or retributive effect.

POINT II
Although the administrative suspension of a driver's license may arguably have
some remedial purpose or effect, is also has deterrent and retributive effects, and is therefore
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. A subsequent criminal prosecution is therefore
prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

ARGUMENT

POINT I; IF THE ATTEMPT TO SUSPEND
APPELLANTS' DRIVER'S LICENSES HAS ANY
RETRIBUTIVE OR DETERRENT EFFECT, IT IS
PUNISHMENT, AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY BARS THIS
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

3

This case concerns that aspect of double jeopardy protection which prohibits
a second attempt to impose punishment:
This Court many times has held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple
punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper. 490
U.S. 435, 440 (1989) (emphasis added).
Halper was a health care administrator who over billed the Government on 65
Medicare claims by representing that $12.00 services had been provided on each claim when
in fact only $3.00 services were furnished. He was convicted criminally, sent to prison and
fined $5,000. Then the Government brought a civil False Claims Act case against him
seeking the statutory penalty of $2,000 per claim, or $130,000. On Halper's appeal the
Supreme Court framed the issue as follows:
We turn, finally, to the unresolved question implicit in our
cases: whether and under what circumstances a civil penalty
may constitute punishment for the purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 490 U.S. at 446.
Holding that the statutory penalty as applied to Halper violates the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, the Halper court formulated a new test for determining whether a
civil sanction constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes:
(A) civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment,
as we have come to understand that term. 490 U.S. at 448
(emphasis added).
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This test, applied in Halper to a statutory civil penalty on double jeopardy
grounds, was applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate a civil forfeiture under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment in Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S.

, 113 S. Ct.

2801 (1993).1
There is language in Halper, frequently embraced by prosecutors, that created
confusion about what the Court will deem punishment:
(U)nder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who has been
punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction
may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a
deterrent or retribution. 490 U.S. at 448-449.
Does Halper say that a civil sanction is punitive when it is only a deterrent or retribution, and
that any remedial aspect will save the sanction from the characterization as punishment? Or
does Halper say that even if a civil sanction has some remedial aspect, if it also has any
element of deterrence or retribution, it will be punishment for double jeopardy purposes?
This question was settled in Austin v. U.S., supra. The Government had argued
in that case that civil forfeiture statutes had remedial aspects, and that the statutes therefore

1

In the court below, the State argued that the definition of "punishment" differs for
purposes of Fifth Amendment double jeopardy and Eighth Amendment excessivefinesanalysis,
citing Austin and Halper for that proposition. A careful reading of Austin, however, reveals that
the Supreme Court applied the Halper standards. The Ninth Circuit has recently recognized the
Supreme Court's identical approach in defining "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy and
Excessive Fines clauses, holding that if a forfeiture constitutes punishment under Halper criteria,
it constitutes punishment for purposes of both clauses. United States v. $405.089.23 U.S.
Currency. 33 Fed.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) at 1219.
5

could not be characterized as punishment. The Supreme Court, expressly applying the
punishment analysis of Halper to the forfeiture statutes, observed:
Fundamentally, even assuming that (the forfeiture statutes) serve
some remedial purpose, the Government's argument must fail.
"(A) civil sanction that cannot be said solely to serve a remedial
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have
come to understand that term." Halper, 490 U.S., at 448
{emphasis added}. 113 Sup.Ct. at 2812.
(W)e are mindful of the fact that sanctions frequently serve
more than one purpose. We need not exclude the possibility that
a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is
subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We,
however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving
in part to punish. We said in Halper that wCa civil sanction that
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment" (citation omitted). 113 S.
Ct. at 2806.
Under United States v. Halper . . . the question is whether
forfeiture serves in part to punish, and one need not exclude the
possibility that forfeiture serves other purposes to reach that
conclusion. 113 S. Ct. at 2810 n. 12.
This interpretation of the meaning of Halper's test to determine whether a civil
sanction is punishment has also been adopted by the Ninth Circuit:
Just last year (the Supreme Court) reaffirmed its new-found
wisdom, emphasizing again that a sanction which is designed
even in part to deter or punish will constitute punishment,
regardless of whether it also has a remedial purpose. See
Austin v. U.S., 113 Sup.Ct. 2801, 2806, 2812 (1993). United
States v. $405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 Fed.3d 1210, 1219
(1994) (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted this view of the meaning of Halper.2
These cases require that the attempt by the State of Utah to suspend Appellants'
driver's hcenses must be completely free from any retributive or deterrent effect in order to
avoid the characterization as punishment. Whether the administrative suspension hearing3
is civil, criminal or both has no bearing on this issue:
This constitutional protection is intrinsically personal. Its
violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the
actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of
the state... (I)n determining whether a particular civil sanction
constitutes criminal punishment, it is the purposes actually
served by the sanction in question, not the underlying nature of
the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be
evaluated. Halper. supra, at 447 n. 7.
It is therefore not the stated legislative purpose,4 nor any civil-criminal
distinction,5 that will determine whether the sanction in this case is punishment, but rather
the character of the sanction and the purpose it actually serves.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Dept. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth
Ranch. 511 U.S.

, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), has been widely cited in nationwide

proceedings involving the precise issue presented on this appeal. The case, however, is of

2

State v. A House and 1.37 Acres. 886 P. 2d 534 (Utah 1994), discussed below at page

3

Commonly referred to as &per se hearing.

11.

4

As expressed in §53-3-222, Utah Code Ann., as enacted by Laws, 1983, set out on
page 9 below.
5

See, e.g., Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979); City of
Orem v. CrandalL 760 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1988).
7

only limited application here, because the Supreme Court in Kurth Ranch specifically
distinguished between ordinary civil penalties and taxes.6 However, certain features of the
Montana drug tax which led to its demise in Kurth Ranch are identical to the Utah
administrative per se suspension:
(T)his so-called tax is conditioned on the commission of a
crime. . . That condition is significant of penal and prohibitory
intent. . . (The tax) is exacted only after the taxpayer has been
arrested for the precise conduct that gives rise to the tax
obligation in the first place. Persons who have been arrested for
possessing marijuana constitute the entire class of taxpayers
subject to the Montana tax. 114 Sup.Ct. at 1947.
The administrative suspension of a driver's license in Utah is similarly conditioned on the
commission of the crime of DUI; the per se suspension is exacted only after the driver has
been arrested for the precise conduct which leads to the attempted criminal prosecution, and
persons who have been arrested for DUI constitute the entire class of drivers subject to the
administrative suspension of their license.

POINT H: THE SUSPENSION OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE
HAS BOTH DETERRENT AND RETRIBUTIVE
EFFECTS AND IS THEREFORE PUNISHMENT
DESPITE ANY REMEDIAL PURPOSE, CHARACTER
OR EFFECT.

6

"Neither a high rate of taxation nor an obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks
this tax a form of punishment. . . Subjecting Montana's drug tax to Halper \s test for civil
penalties is therefore inappropriate." 114 S. Ct. at 1946, 1948 (emphasis added).
8

The suspension of a driver's license has mixed effects. It is frequently argued
that the administrative suspension has the remedial effect of removing potentially dangerous
drivers from the road. This is expressed by the Legislature as follows:

The Legislature finds that a primary purpose of this title relating
to the suspension or revocation of a person's license or privilege
to drive a motor vehicle for (DUI) is protecting persons on the
highways by quickly removing those persons who have shown
they are safety hazards. Sec. 53-3-222, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
as enacted by Laws, 1983 (Italics added).
This section7 raises three significant points:
1. The section does not say that the only purpose of the legislation (as required
by Halper to save it from the label as punishment) is remedial. It does not
even say that the primary purpose of the statute is remedial. It only says
that one of the statute's primary purposes is quickly to remove the driver
from the highway.
2. The driver in question is not "quickly removed" from the highways even
when the administrative suspension is enforced. Instead, although the
driver's license is taken from the driver by the arresting officer, the driver
is issued a temporary drivers license which permits the driver to continue
to operate a vehicle on the roads of this state for a period of 29 days after
7

No written legislative history further explaining the legislative purpose of this section
appears to exist, nor were audio tapes of comments made by proponents and opponents of the
per se suspension legislation found to be of use in identifying any other purpose than that
expressed in the statute itself However, it is not the legislative purpose which controls, but
rather the effect of the legislation itself Halper. supra, at 443, 447-8.
9

the DUI arrest.8
3. One of the mandatory criminal penalties for a conviction of DUI is identical
to the administrative suspension;9 the criminal conviction requires that the
Department suspend the driver's license for 90 days, the exact sanction
provided in the administrative proceeding.

Accordingly, the administrative suspension is punishment, even though the
Legislature may have attempted to characterize it, in part, as remedial. The retributive effect
of the administrative suspension is illustrated by a common occurrence in our system: the
driver's license is suspended at the administrative hearing, but the criminal charge of DUI
cannot for one reason or another be proven. Either the driver is acquitted, the charge is
dismissed, or reduced to some lesser offense (typically "alcohol related reckless driving")
which does not require suspension of the driver's license. In such a case retribution in the
form of license suspension has been exacted administratively despite that it could not have
been accomplished in the criminal case:

If a defendant is found not guilty of driving while impaired, how
do we explain the MVD suspension at that point? Do we
apologize for the inconvenience? In some cases, persons lose
their employment as a result of their license being suspended.
In this context, the action could certainly be considered a
punishment, and an unnecessary one at that. State of Arizona v.

8

Section 53-3-223, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as enacted by Laws, 1983, as amended.

9

Section 41-6-44(12), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as enacted by Laws, 1983, as amended.
10

Austin. 94 LWUSA 1177 (Flagstaff Munic. Ct. Coconino Cty.
12/20/94).

Besides retribution, a second characterization of punishment is deterrence. It
cannot be disputed that the per se administrative suspension of a drivers license is also a
powerfiil deterrent. The fact that under the present system, the State of Utah has not one, but
two chances to suspend a driver's license is an obvious deterrent to driving under the
influence, and a significant portion of that deterrence is attributable to the "extra" chance the
State has because of the per se hearing. This procedure is unique. All other suspension of
Utah driver's licenses depend on a criminal conviction for some specified offense, and no
offense other than DUI affords the State two separate and unrelated opportunities to suspend
the license.
These retributive and deterrent effects of the administrative suspension
procedure bring it squarely within the ambit of punishment as the Supreme Court has defined
that term for double jeopardy purposes. State cases which hold to the contrary were all
decided before the Supreme Court in Austin made its decision in Halper clearly applicable
to condemn any civil sanction which has any element of deterrence or retribution. The Utah
Supreme Court has recognized that the United States Supreme Court considers that the
existence of some remedial aspect will not save a civil sanction that has some retributive or
deterrent effect:

11

(In Austin) The Court rejected the Government's assertion that
the Eighth Amendment was not implicated because the statutes
were, at least in part, remedial. Instead the Court indicated that
'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment,
as we have come to understand that term. State v. A House and
1.37 Acres. 886 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah 1994).

CONCLUSION
The Utah per se administrative suspension procedure seeks to impose a civil
sanction that has both deterrent and retributive effects

Because of those aspects the

procedure must be characterized as an attempt to impose punishment. The subsequent
criminal prosecution is therefore barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Austin v. U.S.. 509 U.S.

, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. Halper.

490 U.S. 435(1989).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s / ^ d a y of June, 1995.

'D. EDMONDS
torney for Appellants

HN BLAIR HUTCHISON
Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on J u n e / ^ , 1995, I served the foregoing Appellant's
Brief on opposing counsel by mailing, postage prepaid, two exact copies thereof to the
following.
TODD A. UTZINGER
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

EDMONDS
Attorney for Appellants
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ADDENDUM
Second Judicial Circuit Orders Denying Appellants' Motions to Dismis

EXHIBIT 1

JAY D. EDMONDS #957
1660 Orchard Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: 484-3218
and
JOHN BLATR HUTCHISON #1607
FLORENCE and HUTCHISON
818 - 26th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: 399-9291
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL CmCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LAYTON CITY,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
Case No.

vs FLORENCE
AND
HUTCHISON

BRET RAY ARBON,

Judge

Defendant.

PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT
LAW

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss having come before the Court for hearing
on April 19, 1995, and the Court having read and considered the memoranda of each

818 - » T H STREET
OGDEN, UTAH 84401

State of Utah v. Arbon
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

party and having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant's motion to Dismiss on the ground that this prosecution is
barred by double jeopardy is DENIED.
DATED this /f_ day of dfxJl

, 1995.

BY THE COURT.

^ .

kj$v/

CIRCUIT/COURT JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Order Denying Defendant's Moaon
to Dismiss by mailing, postage prepaid, a copy thereof on the

day of

,

1995 to the following:
FLORENCE
AND
HUTCHISON

PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION

Susant Hunt
Layton City Prosecutor
425 North Wasatch Drive
Layton, Utah 84041
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTTV OF DAVfS

ATTORNEYS AT
LAW

f
S18 26TH STREET
OGDEN UTAH 84401

r

t.

)

~mz *y certify *fta2 *he annexacl ana
* "i <rje and "uli copy of tho
" ^nohr proceedings on lile in
;.SA C.rcujt CourL
Daie^this^day <A(^2L^£.
r~\ 7
,
c^ 'J />
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JAY D. EDMONDS #957
1660 Orchard Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: 484-3218
and
JOHN BLAm HUTCHISON #1607
FLORENCE and HUTCHISON
818 - 26th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: 399-9291
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL CmCUIT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
LAYTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

SOUTH WEBER
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO DISMISS
Case No.

- vs KIMBERLY SUE MDLLIGAN,

Judge Roger Bean

Defendant.
FLORENCE
AND
HUTCHISON

ROtESSIONAL
ORPORATION

HTORNEYS AT
LAW

I - 26TH STREET
DEN, UTAH 84401

Defendant's motion to dismiss having come on regularly for hearing the
17th day of April, 1995, and the parties having argued their respective positionss and
the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, NOW

South Weber v. Milligan
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss shall be
and is hereby DENIED.

-at

DATED this j £ day of ttjtfJL , 1995.

CIRCUIT JUDGE

FLORENCE
AND
HUT CHISON

STATE OF UTAH
)
CO <; WTY OF DAVIS )
PROFESSIONAL
ORPORATION

\TTORNEYS AT
LAW

8 - 26TII STREET
.DEN, UTAH 84401

W

'

< tfc hereby certify thai the annexed and
fceooing is a true and falf copy of ifte
docLfronts and/or proceeding© onffteta
the i.ayton Circuit Court
Dated this v day of

7\

^ > - J. «s ''$
..1©Ji.

